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Notes and Comments
Fit to be Tried: Bypassing Procedural
Safeguards to Involuntarily Medicate
Incompetent Defendants to Death
INTRODUCTION
As increasing numbers of mentally ill patients find them-
selves within the criminal justice system coupled with the ready
availability of antipsychotic medications capable of rendering
these patients competent to stand trial, courts are charged with a
duty to safeguard the rights of mentally ill defendants against the
prosecutorial interests of the state. Specifically, courts must pre-
scribe explicit standards and procedures for balancing a state's
prosecutorial interests with the liberty interests of those who are
adjudged to be legally incompetent by virtue of a mental illness.
Two recent cases coming out of the United States Court of Appeals
for the Eighth Circuit have grappled with this precise dilemma.
In United States v. Sell,' a three judge panel of the Eighth
Circuit held that the government could involuntarily medicate
Charles Sell, a mentally incompetent defendant charged with a
non-violent felony, with antipsychotic drugs for the sole purpose of
restoring his competency to stand trial.2 Several months later the
same court relied partly upon its decision in Sell to conclude that
the State of Arkansas could involuntarily medicate a condemned
mentally incompetent inmate to control his violent behavior, even
though the medication would likely have the ancillary effect of
1. 282 F.3d 560 (8th Cir. 2002), vacated by 539 U.S. 166 (2003).
2. Id. at 572.
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rendering the inmate competent enough to be executed. 3
In both Sell and Singleton, the Eighth Circuit premised its
holdings upon a fairly expansive interpretation of the United
States Supreme Court's doctrine concerning the limits secured by
the Due Process Clause upon a state's power to subject mentally
ill inmates to unwanted psychiatric medication. Although the Su-
preme Court had addressed this issue on two prior occasions, 4 the
guidelines established for lower courts to follow were unclear, if
not contradictory.5 Accordingly, the Supreme Court reviewed the
Eighth Circuit's holding in Sell, concluding that involuntarily
medicating a mentally incompetent defendant for the sole purpose
of restoring trial competency does not, in principle, offend due
process. 6 However, because the Eighth Circuit paid too little at-
tention to how involuntary medication would impact Sell's ability
to participate effectively in his own defense, the Supreme Court
vacated the Eighth Circuit's judgment, reinstated the district
court's involuntary medication order, and remanded the case for a
thorough determination of how the potential side-effects of antip-
sychotic medication would affect Sell's right to receive a fair trial.
7
3. Singleton v. Norris, 319 F.3d 1018, 1025-27 (8th Cir. 2003).
4. See Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127, 133-38 (1992) (distinguishing
Washington v. Harper to hold that the forced administration of antipsychotic
medication during the defendant's trial violated rights guaranteed by the
Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments); Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210,
227 (1990) (holding that treatment of a prisoner with antipsychotic drugs
against his will without judicial hearing did not violate substantive due proc-
ess where the prisoner was found to be dangerous to himself or others and
treatment was in the prisoner's best medical interest).
5. See infra Part II.A.3.
6. See Sell, 539 U.S. at 179-80. The Supreme Court set out the standard
as follows:
[T]he Constitution permits the Government involuntarily to
administer antipsychotic drugs to a mentally ill defendant fac-
ing serious criminal charges in order to render that defendant
competent to stand trial, but only if the treatment is medically
appropriate, is substantially unlikely to have side effects that
may undermine the fairness of the trial, and, taking account of
less intrusive alternatives, is necessary significantly to further
important governmental trial-related interests.
Id. at 179.
7. Sell, 539 U.S. at 185-86; see infra Part I. In addition to the therapeu-
tic benefits of relieving the acute symptoms of psychosis, many types of an-
tipsychotic drugs are accompanied with severe and often debilitating side
effects that can profoundly impact a patient's ability to comprehend and ef-
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Although the Sell Court's holding has (at least temporarily)
prevented the government from medicating Sell, the decision may
prove a hollow victory for those who fear that psychiatric medica-
tion will no longer be used primarily for therapeutic purposes, but
rather as an instrument employed by the state solely in further-
ance of its own prosecutorial interests. Indeed, these fears have
been validated by the Supreme Court itself, as Sell unambigu-
ously stands for the proposition that a state may, use psychiatric
medication as a means of restoring trial competency,8 a purpose
wholly unrelated to a mentally ill defendant's need for treatment.
Moreover, by virtue of the Supreme Court's recent decision to deny
certiorari in Singleton,9 the Court has granted the states carte
blanche to treat Sell as a license to administer antipsychotic drugs
to mentally incompetent condemned inmates for the sole purpose
of carrying out a death sentence.
This note argues that the Supreme Court's opinion in Sell re-
quires lower courts to apply a unique hybrid of intermediate and
strict scrutiny in all cases involving the involuntary medication of
criminal defendants who are mentally incompetent to stand trial
by virtue of a treatable mental illness. Specifically, lower courts
must entertain a four-part inquiry to balance a defendant's inter-
ests with that of the state. 10 This standard ultimately permits
state officials to seek involuntary medication of mentally ill in-
mates by proffering purposes related to treatment as a pretext for
medication when the ultimate purpose is simply to further the
state's prosecutorial interests.
Part I of this Note will outline the procedural history of Sell
leading up to its arrival in the Supreme Court. Part II will deline-
ate the important distinction between the need to medicate men-
tally ill inmates and others in institutional settings who pose a
fectively participate in the judicial process through which his fate will be de-
cided. Harper, 494 U.S. at 229. The common side effects most relevant to the
issue of preserving a defendant's right to a fair trial are tardive dyskinesia
(the involuntary movement of facial muscles), acute dystonia (severe involun-
tary spasms of the upper body, tongue, throat, or eyes), akathesia (motor
restlessness or the inability to sit still), id. at 229-30, parkinsonism (involun-
tary tremor of limbs, slowed speech, and abnormal facial expressions), and
severe sedation. Riggins, 504 U.S. at 142-43 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
8. See Sell, 539 U.S. at 179-80.
9. Singleton v. State, 540 U.S. 832 (2003).
10. See infra Part III.B.
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danger to themselves on the one hand, and the desire of prosecu-
tors to use psychiatric drugs to restore trial competency so that
the defendant may be convicted despite his or her true mental ca-
pacity on the other. Specifically, because courts must safeguard a
pretrial detainee's right to receive a fair trial, the Supreme Court's
case law prior to Sell strongly suggested that lower courts should
subject all requests to medicate pretrial detainees to a stronger
level of judicial scrutiny than in cases involving convicted in-
mates.11 Part III will analyze how the Supreme Court's holding in
Sell incorporates elements of both intermediate and strict scrutiny
as the Court struggles to strike a compromise between the gov-
ernment's interest in prosecuting serious crimes and an individ-
ual's liberty interest in refusing unwanted medication.
Additionally, Part III will demonstrate how the Sell Court obfus-
cates the essential distinctions between medicating inmates to
mitigate their propensity for dangerousness and medicating solely
for trial competency purposes. Finally, Part IV will assert that the
Supreme Court has failed to prescribe uniform standards in
measuring the competency of mentally ill inmates residing on
death row. Because of the lack of uniform standards in measuring
the competency of condemned inmates, lower courts may begin to
expand the Court's holding in Sell into a justification to medicate
mentally incompetent condemned inmates for the sole purpose of
restoring competency for execution.
I. FACTS AND TRAVEL OF SELL V. UNITED STATES
In the spring of 1997, Dr. Charles Sell, a practicing dentist
with an extensive history of mental illness, was indicted on multi-
ple counts of Medicaid fraud and money laundering. 12 After being
diagnosed with a severe mental illness, a federal district court
found that Sell was incapable of assisting in his own defense, thus
declaring him incompetent to stand trial.1 3 During the course of
his detention in a prison hospital, Sell's psychiatrists concluded
that he was in need of antipsychotic medication.14 Because Sell re-
fused to accept any form of treatment for his mental illness, prison
11. See infra Part II.A.
12. Sell, 539 U.S. at 170.
13. United States v. Sell, 282 F.3d 560, 563 (8th Cir. 2002), vacated by
539 U.S. 166 (2003).
14. Id. at 563.
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officials initiated an administrative hearing in order to determine
whether Sell could be involuntarily medicated.15 At the conclusion
of the hearing, the reviewing psychiatrist approved the involun-
tary medication order upon concluding that Sell was "mentally ill
and dangerous," and that medication was necessary in order to re-
store Sell's competency to stand trial.16 In August, 2000, a federal
magistrate reviewed and affirmed the government's order author-
izing involuntary medication. 7 Upon further review, however, a
district court judge reversed the magistrate's finding that Sell's
dangerousness justified involuntary medication, but nonetheless
held that the government could medicate Sell for the sole purpose
of restoring trial competency.' 8
In March, 2002, the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district
court's holding that the government could medicate Sell on the
sole grounds of restoring trial competency.' 9 After concluding that
the government's interest in bringing Sell to trial outweighed his
liberty interest to refuse unwanted medication, 20 the Eighth Cir-
cuit held that the decision to medicate Sell was medically appro-
priate, and that the benefits of restoring Sell's competency
outweighed the potential risk that the side effects of antipsychotic
drugs might impair his ability to participate effectively in his own
defense at trial. 21
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to examine the limited
issue of whether the government could medicate Sell solely for the
purpose of restoring his competency to stand trial for "non-violent
offenses."22 In the wake of the Eighth Circuit's holding in Sell, the
Supreme Court was faced with the task of determining the cir-
cumstances under which the government's interest in prosecuting
alleged crimes could, in theory, override an individual's constitu-
tional right to refuse unwanted medication under the Due Process
Clause.23 Moreover, the Court was charged with the daunting task
15. Sell, 539 U.S. at 171.
16. Id. at 171-72.
17. Id. at 173.
18. Id. at 173-74.
19. Id. at 174.
20. Sell, 282 F.3d at 568 (defining the government's interest in restoring
Sell's competency so that he may be brought to trial as "paramount").
21. Id. at 570-72.
22. Sell, 539 U.S. at 175.
23. Id. at 177.
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of ascertaining the degree to which the administration of powerful
antipsychotic drugs might impair Sell's constitutional right to re-
ceive a fair trial.24 To comprehend these critical issues, one must
first examine the Court's prior case law concerning the constitu-
tional limitations on a state's power to medicate mentally ill pa-
tients within the context of the criminal justice system.
II. INVOLUNTARY MEDICATION UNDER THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE
A. Substantive Due Process Prior to Sell
1. Washington v. Harper
25
Because the Supreme Court has declared that all persons en-
joy a significant liberty interest in avoiding unwanted medical
treatment of any kind,26 the involuntary medication of the men-
tally ill must comport with the minimal standards of substantive
due process. 27 On the one hand, states are often justified in impos-
ing treatment upon mentally disabled persons who are incapable
of making rational decisions concerning their own medical treat-
ment.28 In such cases, a state may certainly invoke its parens pa-
triae power by imposing treatment upon a mentally ill person
against his will to protect both the mentally ill person and the
community from that person's dangerous tendencies. 29 On the
other hand, the judiciary has historically played an essential role
in ensuring that a state's power to impose treatment upon the
mentally disabled is used narrowly in the furtherance of public
health and safety, and not simply to further some other hidden
purpose. 30 There are, however, instances where a mentally ill per-
son's need for treatment and a state's police powers intersect, such
as when a mentally ill person would pose a danger to himself or
24. See id. at 180.
25. Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210 (1990).
26. Cruzan v. Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 278 (1990).
27. See Harper, 494 U.S. at 221-22.
28. See Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 317 (1982).
29. Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 426 (1979); see also Sell, 539 U.S.
at 178.
30. See O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 574 n.10 (1975) ("Where
'treatment' is the sole asserted ground for depriving a person of liberty, it is
plainly unacceptable to suggest that the courts are powerless to determine
whether the asserted ground is present.").
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others if left untreated. In those instances, the state's power to
impose treatment is at its highest.31
The case of Washington v. Harper was the first in which the
Supreme Court dealt with the issue of a state's authority to invol-
untarily medicate a convicted inmate suffering from a severe men-
tal illness.32 Harper involved the constitutionality of a state policy
mandating involuntary medication for inmates "sufferfing] from a
'mental disorder," who were "'gravely disabled' or pose[d] a 'likeli-
hood of serious harm' to themselves or others.33 Although the
Court in Harper conceded that an inmate has "a significant liberty
interest in avoiding the unwanted administration of antipsychotic
drugs,"34 the Court held that an inmate's liberty interest could be
outweighed by the state's legitimate and important interest in
maintaining safety and security within a penal institution.35
Moreover, while acknowledging the plethora of potentially harm-
ful side effects commonly associated with most forms of antipsy-
chotic medication, the Court concluded that involuntary
medication was a far more appropriate method of controlling a
mentally ill inmate's behavior than the prolonged use of physical
restraints or isolation.36 Therefore, the Court held that the Due
Process Clause allows a state to involuntarily medicate a mentally
ill inmate after finding that the inmate is "dangerous to himself or
others and [that] the treatment is in the inmate's medical inter-
est."
3 7
The Court rejected Harper's argument that the state "may not
override his choice to refuse antipsychotic drugs" in the absence of
a finding that he was incompetent to make rational decisions con-
cerning his own treatment.3 8 Rather, because a state's desire to
medicate a dangerous, mentally ill inmate is "reasonably related
to legitimate penological interests" in maintaining institutional
safety,39 the Court held that Harper's case was on point with prior
cases in which the Court applied a rational basis test to decisions
31. See id. at 582; Addington, 441 U.S. at 426.
32. See Harper, 494 U.S. at 213.
33. Id. at 215.
34. Id. at 221.
35. Id. at 225.
36. Id. at 226-27.
37. Id. at 227.
38. Id. at 222.
39. Id. at 224 (quoting Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987)).
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made by state officials concerning the care and treatment of indi-
viduals confined in state institutions.40 Most significantly, the
state's interest in medicating Harper was at its highest because
the prison regulation in question was exclusively applied to in-
mates who had become dangerous as a result of a mental illness,
and the underlying rationale was solely to medicate inmates "for
no purpose other than treatment, and only under the direction of a
licensed psychiatrist."41 Moreover, considering that prison officials
face the uniquely perilous task of regulating a state's prison popu-
lation,42 the Harper Court concluded that an administrative panel
composed of medical professionals would be more qualified than
judges and lawyers to determine when an inmate is in need of in-
voluntary medication.43 Reasoning that the administrative review
conducted by medical decision makers that was warranted by the
Harper prison policy was adequate to protect prison inmates' due
process interests," the Court refused to intervene because the de-
cision to medicate Harper "was at all times consistent 'with the
degree of care, skill, and learning expected of a reasonably pru-
dent psychiatrist .. .
2. Riggins v. Nevada
46
In contrast with Harper, in which the Court examined the cir-
cumstances under which a state could involuntarily medicate a
convicted inmate,47 the Supreme Court was asked in Riggins v.
Nevada to determine whether a state could prevent a pre-trial de-
tainee charged with capital murder from discontinuing treatment
for a mental illness so as to preserve his competency to stand
trial.48 Because state officials never alleged that Riggins posed a
40. Id. at 224-25.
41. Id. at 226.
42. Id. at 225 ("There are few cases in which the State's interest in com-
bating the danger posed by a person to both himself and others is greater
than in a prison environment, which, 'by defimition,' is made up of persons
with 'a demonstrated proclivity for antisocial criminal, and often violent, con-
duct."' (quoting Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 526 (1984))).
43. Id. at 231.
44. Id. at 233.
45. Id.
46. Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127 (1992).
47. Harper, 494 U.S. at 210.
48. Riggens, 504 U.S. at 132-33.
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danger to himself or others within his prison setting, the sole jus-
tification for forced medication was Nevada's interest in prevent-
ing Riggins from rendering himself incompetent to stand trial by
allowing his mental illness to go untreated. 49 In deference to Ne-
vada's interest in prosecuting a capital offense, the Riggins Court
opined that Nevada "might have been able to justify medically ap-
propriate, involuntary treatment with the drug by establishing
that it could not obtain an adjudication of Riggins' guilt or inno-
cence by using less intrusive means." 0 This was a profound
statement. The Riggins Court seemed to postulate that the hold-
ing in Harper could conceivably be expanded to empower a state to
medicate an inmate for a purpose completely unrelated to medical
treatment or prison safety. The Court annunciated this possibility
even though the prosecution had not proven that it could not ob-
tain an adjudication of Riggins' guilt or innocence by using less in-
trusive means in that particular case.51 Even more disturbing is
the fact that the Court's hypothetical expansion of Harper was
completely unnecessary because the pertinent issue facing the
Court was whether the side effects caused by the medication given
to Riggins subjected him to unfair prejudice at trial.5 2
Unlike in Harper, where the state sought to medicate a con-
victed inmate, a state's decision to medicate a pretrial detainee
must be examined in relation to the detainee's right to a fair
trial.5 3 For example, in holding that the State had not proven that
administration of antipsychotic medication was necessary to ac-
complish an essential state purpose, or that the "substantial prob-
ability of trial prejudice in [Riggins] was justified,"54 the Riggins
Court was deeply concerned with the fact that the side effects of
many common antipsychotic drugs can adversely affect an indi-
vidual's cognitive and communicative abilities so as to cast doubt
upon the defendant's ability to assist counsel, react to testimony,
and to testify on his own behalf.55 Moreover, in his concurring
49. See id. at 130.
50. Id. at 135.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 133 (stating that "Riggins' core contention [was] that involun-
tary administration of Mellaril denied him 'a full and fair trial').
53. Id. at 140-41 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
54. Id. at 138.
55. Id. at 137-38; see also David M. Siegel et al., Old Law Meets New
Medicine: Revisiting Involuntary Psychotropic Medication of the Criminal De-
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opinion, Justice Kennedy conveyed his fear that since many anti-
psychotic drugs can cause an individual to become lethargic and
severely agitated, or to appear listless and apathetic, a jury may
unfairly pass judgment upon a defendant solely on the basis of his
drug-induced demeanor.56 Consequently, Justice Kennedy was
highly skeptical that a state could ever justify the use of involun-
tary medication as an appropriate method to restore trial compe-
tency.5 7 As such, the Court was particularly disturbed by the trial
court's refusal to allow Riggins to discontinue treatment for his
mental illness even in light of inconclusive expert testimony as to
whether involuntary treatment was even necessary in maintain-
ing Riggins' competency to stand trial. 58 Accordingly, the Court re-
fused to defer to the trial court's "laconic" finding that the state's
interest in preserving Riggins' competency simply outweighed
Riggins' right to refuse medication. 59
In sum, the necessity of preserving a pretrial detainee's right
to receive a fair trial juxtaposed with an already convicted in-
mates interest in refusing medication distinguishes Riggins from
Harper. As such, the Harper Court had little reason to second
guess the assertions made by Harper's prison psychiatrists that
the need to pacify his violent behavior with medication simply
outweighed whatever unpleasant side effects he would experience.
fendant, 2001 Wis. L. REV. 307, 326-27 (2001).
56. See Riggins, 504 U.S. at 142 (Kennedy, J., concurring); see also Siegel
et al., supra note 55, at 327 n.111. A defendant's in-court demeanor can be
especially crucial in capital murder cases because many juries may be more
inclined to vote in favor of imposing the death penalty when the side effects of
antipsychotic medication cause a defendant to appear remorseless and apa-
thetic. State v. Garcia, 658 A.2d 947, 974-75 (Conn. 1995) (Berdon, J., concur-
ring). This is also an especially vital concern in cases where the defendant is
attempting to prove lack of mental capacity as an affirmative defense. Id. at
975 (Berdon, J., concurring).
57. See Riggins, 504 U.S. at 141 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Justice Ken-
nedy stated:
In my view elementary protections against state intrusion re-
quire the State in every case to make a showing that there is
no significant risk that the medication will impair or alter in
any material way the defendant's capacity or willingness to
react to the testimony at trial or to assist his counsel. Based
on my understanding of the medical literature, I have sub-
stantial reservations that the State can make that showing.
Id.
58. Id. at 130-31, 136-37.
59. Id. at 136.
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However, the administration of antipsychotic medication to main-
tain trial competency entails a plethora of risks not otherwise as-
sociated with the inducement of "some bare level of functional
competence."60 Likewise, while a psychiatrist may have been in a
better position to determine the propriety of involuntary medica-
tion in Harper, the impact a particular drug might have upon a
defendant's ability to present an effective and vigorous defense to
a criminal charge is an issue not to be deferred to psychiatrists
who are otherwise ignorant as to the complexities of a criminal
trial, but is best resolved by the attorneys and judges who partici-
pate in the trial process itself.61 Therefore, Riggins stands for the
proposition that a court may not authorize the involuntary medi-
cation of a pretrial detainee without specific evidence of a "compel-
ling" or "essential" state interest,62 and that the detainee cannot
be brought to trial through "less intrusive means."63
3. Conflicting Standards of Judicial Scrutiny in the Aftermath of
Riggins
The Court's opinion in Riggins has been widely noted for its
failure to prescribe a precise standard of judicial scrutiny for cases
involving the involuntary medication of pretrial detainees.6" Al-
though the Riggins Court held that Nevada's desire to medicate a
defendant charged with capital murder was not "necessary to ac-
complish an essential state policy," 65 the Court explicitly denied
that it was adopting any standard of judicial review, let alone
strict scrutiny.66
The Riggins Court's equivocation, however, has not escaped
criticism. In his dissenting opinion in Riggins, Justice Thomas
60. Riggins, 504 U.S. at 141 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
61. See id. at 141 (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("Indeed, the inquiry itself is
elusive, for it assumes some baseline of normality that experts may have
some difficulty in establishing for a particular defendant, if they can estab-
lish it at all.").
62. Id. at 138.
63. Id. at 135.
64. See, e.g., Siegel et al., supra note 55, at 326; Aimee Feinberg, Note,
Forcible Medication of Mentally Ill Criminal Defendants: The Case of Russell
Eugene Weston, Jr., 54 STAN. L. REV. 769, 775 (2002); William B. Bystrynski,
Note, Riggins v. Nevada: Toward a Standard for Medicating the Incompetent
Defendant to Competence, 71 N.C. L. REV. 1206, 1220 (1993).
65. Riggins, 504 U.S. at 138 (emphasis added).
66. Id. at 136.
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balked at the majority's insistence that it had not adopted a stan-
dard of strict scrutiny. 67 In support of his view that the majority
had essentially applied a strict scrutiny analysis, Justice Thomas
highlighted the majority's requirement that Nevada's interest in
maintaining Riggins' trial competency must rise to the level of a
compelling state interest, and that Nevada was required to prove
that the proposed medication was the least intrusive means avail-
able in bringing Riggins to trial.68 Because the terminology em-
ployed by the Riggins Court usually implies the application of
strict scrutiny,69 Justice Thomas was quite justified in his refusal
to believe the majority's denial that it was not adopting a strict
scrutiny standard of review.
Justice Thomas was not alone in refusing to take the Riggins
Court's majority at face value. In United States v. Brandon,70 for
instance, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
held that all petitions to medicate a pretrial detainee must survive
strict scrutiny.7 1 Beginning from the premise that the govern-
ment's request to medicate a pretrial detainee implicates a "fun-
damental right to be free from bodily intrusion,"72 the Sixth
Circuit concluded that the Riggins Court had "alluded to a strict
scrutiny approach."73 While acknowledging that the Riggins Court
67. See id. at 156 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
68. Id. at 156-57 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
69. E.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227, 237-38
(1995) (holding that under strict scrutiny, states may not use "benign" racial
classifications except in the furtherance of a compelling state interest, and
only after the consideration of "race neutral" alternatives); Palmore v. Sidoti,
466 U.S. 429, 432-33 (1984) (holding that in applying strict scrutiny to racial
classifications, such classifications "must be justified by a compelling gov-
ernmental interest and must be 'necessary... to the accomplishment' of their
legitimate purpose" (quoting McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 196
(1964))); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 305 (1978) (hold-
ing that racial classifications must further a "'permissible and substantial'"
state policy, and that the classifications must be "'necessary ... to the accom-
plishment of [the state's] purpose'" (quoting In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717, 721-
22 (1973))); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973) (holding that state intru-
sions upon "fundamental rights" are valid only in the face of a "compelling
state interest," and that such legislative intrusions must be "narrowly drawn
to express only the legitimate state interests at stake").
70. United States v. Brandon, 158 F.3d 947 (6th Cir. 1998).
71. Id. at 960.
72. Id. at 957.
73. Id.
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had expressly declined to adopt a specific standard of review, 74 the
Sixth Circuit nonetheless concluded that Riggins stood for the
proposition that the government's request to medicate a pretrial
detainee must be "narrowly tailored to [further] a compelling gov-
ernmental interest" in restoring the detainee's trial competency. 75
In addition, the Sixth Circuit distinguished the Riggins Court's
analysis from the rational basis test applied in Harper, a case in
which a state's petition to medicate a mentally ill convicted in-
mate found to be dangerous was held to be entitled to review un-
der a rational basis test because the state's interest was limited to
a legitimate penological interest in maintaining prison safety.76
Unlike cases involving the involuntary medication of convicted
inmates, where maintaining prison safety is a primary concern,
the Sixth Circuit concluded that the government's goal in Brandon
was not to maintain prison safety, but rather to "render[] [the de-
fendant] competent to stand trial in a proceeding that is fair to
both parties."77 In such circumstances, strict scrutiny was held to
be the proper standard. 78 Therefore, in light of Justice Thomas'
dissent in Riggins and the Sixth Circuit's astute analysis in Bran-
don, Sell's argument before the Supreme Court - that his case re-
quired the application of strict scrutiny - was not without merit.79
Conversely, the equivocal language of the Supreme Court in
Riggins led the Eighth Circuit in Sell to conclude that the gov-
ernment's request to medicate Sell did not trigger strict scrutiny,
but rather a lower form of "heightened" scrutiny.8 0 However, the
74. Id. at 959.
75. Id. at 960. The Brandon Court supported its holding with a quote
from Riggins: "Nevada certainly would have satisfied due process if... the
district court had found. .. that treatment with antipsychotic medication
was medically appropriate and, considering less intrusive alternatives, essen-
tial for the sake of Riggins' own safety or the safety of others." Id. (quoting
Riggins, 504 U.S. at 135 (emphasis added)).
76. Id. at 957 (citing Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 223 (1990)).
77. Id. at 960.
78. See id.
79. See Brief of Petitioner at 35-37, Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166
(2003) (No. 02-5664).
80. United States v. Sell, 282 F.3d 560, 567 n.3 (8th Cir. 2002) ("[Wle be-
lieve that we must apply some sort of heightened standard of review, but
unlike the Sixth Circuit, we do not adopt the strict scrutiny standard."), va-
cated by 539 U.S. 166 (2003). The Eighth Circuit also supported its choice of a
heightened scrutiny standard by mentioning that the Supreme Court denied
adopting a strict scrutiny test in Riggins; it also recognized, however, that
2004]
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Eighth Circuit did not break new ground in its conclusion that
Riggins required something less than strict scrutiny. Rather, the
Eighth Circuit relied heavily upon the opinion in United States v.
Weston, s' a case in which the United States Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia applied a heightened scrutiny analysis to
the government's request to medicate a mentally incompetent de-
fendant charged with capital murder.8 2 Ironically, the language
used by the D.C. Circuit closely resembled a strict scrutiny analy-
sis: "Accordingly, to medicate Weston, the government must prove
that restoring his competence to stand trial is necessary to accom-
plish an essential state policy."83 Unlike the Sixth Circuit, how-
ever, the D.C. Circuit refused to give its test the label of strict
scrutiny, despite the fact that the terminology employed by both
circuits is virtually identical.8 4 Rather, the D.C. Circuit simply
took the Riggins Court at face value, acknowledging that it had
the Court did not appear to apply any lesser, reasonableness-based test ei-
ther. See id. (citing United States v. Weston, 255 F.3d 873, 888 (D.C. Cir.
2001)).
81. United States v. Weston, 255 F.3d 873 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
82. Id. at 880. The defendant in Weston was Russell Eugene Wilson, the
infamous "Capitol Hill Shooter" who had been charged with shooting and kill-
ing two officers of the United States Capitol Hill Police, and injuring a third.
See id. at 874.
83. Weston, 255 F.3d at 880 (emphases added).
84. Compare id. (holding that, to medicate the defendant, "the govern-
ment must prove that restoring his competence to stand trial [was] necessary
to accomplish an essential state interest"), with United States v. Brandon,
158 F.3d 947, 960 (6th Cir. 1998) (holding that the government must present
a "compelling" state interest, and that involuntary medication must be "nar-
rowly tailored" to the furtherance of the government's interest). The only fa-
cial difference between Brandon and Weston is that the Sixth Circuit labels
the requisite governmental interest as "compelling," while the D.C. Circuit
requires an "essential" governmental interest. See Weston, 255 F.3d at 880;
Brandon, 158 F.3d at 960. This seems to be a mere difference in semantics,
however, because both terms are used interchangeably in Riggins. See 504
U.S. 127, 136 (1992) ("Nor did the order indicate a finding that safety or other
compelling concerns outweighed Riggins' interest in freedom from unwanted
antipsychotic drugs") (emphasis added); id at 138:
To be sure, trial prejudice can sometimes be justified by an es-
sential state interest. Because the record contains no finding
that might support a conclusion that administration of anti
psychotic medication was necessary to accomplish an essential
state policy, however, we have no basis for saying that the
substantial probability of trial prejudice in this case was justi-
fied.
Id. (citations omitted) (emphases added).
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not endorsed the application of strict scrutiny, appearances to the
contrary notwithstanding.8 5
Following in the footsteps of the D.C. Circuit, the Eighth Cir-
cuit in Sell held that the government may not involuntarily medi-
cate a pretrial detainee in the absence of an "essential state
interest that outweighs the individual's interest in remaining free
from medication."6 The Eighth Circuit further held that involun-
tary medication must also be narrowly tailored in furtherance of
the state interest, that there be "no less intrusive way of fulfilling
its essential interest."8 7 The Eighth Circuit labeled its test as
"some sort of heightened standard of review," as opposed to strict
scrutiny.8 8
Even if the terminology employed by the circuit courts in Sell
and Weston would seemingly imply the application of strict scru-
tiny, a closer review of the respective opinions will reveal that nei-
ther court employed the "searching judicial inquiry" required
under a strict scrutiny analysis.8 9 For example, in concluding that
involuntary medication was narrowly tailored to the government's
interest in restoring Sell's competency to stand trial,90 the Eighth
Circuit simply deferred to the opinions given by Sell's prison psy-
chiatrists that involuntary medication was the least intrusive
method of fulfilling the government's interest in restoring Sell's
competency to stand trial.91 In deferring to the government's psy-
chiatrists, however, the Eighth Circuit paid little attention to evi-
dence provided at trial by Sell's personal psychiatrist that
antipsychotic medication was not an appropriate method of treat-
ing Sell's condition. 92 In endorsing the conclusions given by the
government's experts, the Eighth Circuit provided no explanation
of why it found the government's conclusions to be more persua-
85. Weston, 255 F.3d at 880 (noting that under Riggins, the government
must present an "overriding justification" for involuntary medication, and
that the medication must be "necessary to accomplish an essential state pol-
icy" (quoting Riggins, 504 U.S. at 135)).
86. Sell, 282 F.3d at 567.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 567 n.7.
89. See e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 236
(1995).
90. Sell, 282 F.3d at 568.
91. See id.
92. See id. at 564.
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sive than the expert testimony given on Sell's behalf.93
Likewise, the D.C. Circuit in Weston simply deferred to the
opinions given by the government's expert witnesses that involun-
tary medication was necessary to bring Weston to trial, while giv-
ing no consideration to conflicting expert testimony that
treatment with antipsychotic medication would be ineffective. 94
Moreover, both circuit courts seemed to place a burden upon both
Weston and Sell of proving that trial competency could be restored
through less intrusive alternatives. 95 However, in applying the
strict scrutiny analysis established by the Sixth Circuit in Bran-
don,96 a federal district court concluded that the testimony given
by a prison psychiatrist was insufficient to establish that involun-
tary medication was narrowly tailored to the government's inter-
est in bringing an incompetent pretrial detainee to trial because
the psychiatrist provided no basis for his conclusion and failed to
discuss the full range of relevant medical research.97 In contrast to
the circuit courts in Weston and Sell, the district court did not
burden the detainee with proving that trial competency could be
restored through less intrusive, non-drug alternatives. 98
Thus, in the wake of Riggins, the terminology used by the
various courts is remarkably similar: a pre-trial detainee may be
involuntarily medicated only in furtherance of a 'compelling' or
93. See id.
94. See United States v. Weston, 255 F.3d 873, 882-83 (D.C. Cir. 2001);
see also United States v. Weston, 134 F. Supp. 2d 115, 122-23 (D.D.C. 2001),
affd on other grounds, 225 F.3d 873 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
95. See Weston, 255 F.3d at 882; Sell, 282 F.3d at 568.
96. 158 F.3d 947, 960 (6th Cir. 1998) (holding that to justify forcible
medication of a non-dangerous pretrial detainee for the purpose of restoring
his competence to stand trial, the government must present a "compelling"
state interest, and the involuntary medication must be "narrowly tailored" to
the furtherance of the government's interest).
97. United States v. Santonio, No. 2:00-CR-90C, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
5892, at *10-13 (D. Utah May 4, 2001); see also Woodland v. Angus, 820 F.
Supp. 1497, 1511-12 (D. Utah 1993) (applying strict scrutiny and holding that
the State of Utah failed to prove "to a reasonable degree of medical certainty"
that involuntary medication would restore a defendant's trial competency be-
cause the state's psychiatrists could not "promise" or "guarantee" that the
proposed medication would successfully restore the defendant's competency).
98. See Santonio, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5892, at *13. Instead, the court
in Santonio required the government to prove that it could not "obtain an ad-
judication of the pretrial dentainee's guilt or innocence using any other
means." Id. This factor weighed against the prosecution when it produced no
evidence with regard to such proof. Id.
FIT TO BE TRIED
'essential' state interest, and the medication must be the 'least in-
trusive' or 'necessary' means of furthering the state's prosecutorial
interest. However, the actual substance behind the abstract ter-
minology is contingent upon whether the reviewing court defines
its standard of review as 'strict' or 'heightened' scrutiny. In other
words, courts that have construed Riggins as requiring the appli-
cation of strict scrutiny have been more emboldened to distrust
the assertions of government psychiatrists that involuntary medi-
cation with antipsychotic drugs is the only means available to re-
store trial competency. Conversely, courts applying a lower
'heightened' standard of review have been disinclined to second
guess the opinions given by the government's psychiatrists, while
further burdening an incompetent pre-trial detainee with the obli-
gation of proving that trial competency could be restored through
less intrusive alternatives. Despite the disparities in the applica-
tion of Riggins, there has been a general consensus among most
courts that the standard of review in cases involving a non-
dangerous pretrial detainee must be higher than the rational ba-
sis test established in Harper for medicating dangerous inmates
who have already been tried and convicted of crimes. 99
99. E.g., United States v. Gomes, 298 F.3d 71, 82 (2d Cir. 2002) (holding
that "heightened, but not strict, scrutiny is the appropriate standard for de-
termining when a non-dangerous criminal defendant may be forcibly medi-
cated with antipsychotic drugs for the purpose of rendering him competent to
stand trial), vacated by 539 U.S. 939 (2003), order affd, 387 F.3d 157 (2d Cir.
2004); United States v. Sell, 282 F.3d 560, 567 n.7 (8th Cir. 2002) ("Like our
sister courts, we believe that we must apply some sort of heightened standard
of review, but. .. we do not adopt the strict scrutiny standard." ), vacated by
539 U.S. 166 (2003); Weston, 255 F.3d at 880 (concluding that Riggins re-
quired the application of "some form of heightened scrutiny," which was
something more than the reasonableness test of Harper as it pertained to
non-dangerous pretrial detainees); see also State v. Jacobs, 828 A.2d 587, 589
(Conn. 2003); State v. Garcia, 658 A.2d 947, 966-67 (Conn. 1995), rev'd on
other grounds, Jacobs, 828 A.2d at 588-89; State v. Odiaga, 871 P.2d 801,
804-05 (Idaho 1994).
At least one court, however, has seen no distinction between Harper
and Riggins, holding that a petition to medicate a pretrial detainee solely for
the purpose of restoring trial competency should merely be subjected to a
reasonableness standard under Harper, because restoring trial competency is
a "legitimate incident of institutionalization." Khiem v. United States, 612
A.2d 160, 168 (D.C. 1992) (quoting United States v. Charters, 863 F.2d 302,
305 (4th Cir. 1988)).
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III. THE SUPREME COURT SPEAKS AGAIN: SELL V. UNITED STATES
A. Prolegomenon
As noted above, the disparate standards of judicial review
employed by the lower courts were a product of the Supreme
Court's equivocation in Riggins. However, unlike in Riggins where
the Court "ha[d] no occasion to finally prescribe... substantive
standards" of review, 100 the Court in Sell was faced with an oppor-
tunity to resolve the existing confusion among the lower courts
once and for all by determining the standard of judicial review to
which a mentally incompetent detainee facing the threat of invol-
untary medication is constitutionally entitled.' 0 ' The Sell Court
seized this opportunity by attempting to establish a clear and ex-
plicit standard of judicial scrutiny to be applied whenever a state
seeks to forcibly medicate a pretrial detainee for the sole purpose
of restoring or maintaining trial competency.102
In reality, the Sell Court's analysis is no less equivocal than
that of the Riggins Court. In deciphering the Sell Court's analysis,
it becomes clear that Sell requires lower courts to apply a hybrid
of both intermediate and strict scrutiny in determining when a
state's prosecutorial interests can override a pretrial detainee's
liberty interest in refusing unwanted medication. As argued be-
low, the Supreme Court's holding in Sell has significantly
strengthened a state's authority to use psychiatric medication to
further policies and goals that are unrelated to the therapeutic in-
terests of mentally ill inmates. Moreover, the Sell Court's opinion
may enable overzealous prosecutors to obfuscate the important
distinctions between involuntarily medicating an inmate to miti-
gate dangerousness and using psychiatric medication to restore
trial competency. Consequently, the prison psychiatrists who are
responsible for treating mentally incompetent inmates may be-
come unwitting accomplices to a state's plan to use the therapeu-
tic benefits of psychiatric medication as a crude method to further
its prosecutorial goals.
100. Riggins, 504 U.S. at 136.
101. See Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166, 179 (2003).
102. See id. at 179-80; see also supra note 4 and accompanying text.
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B. Basic Principles
The Supreme Court in Sell granted certiorari to decide the is-
sue of whether the government's petition to medicate Sell for the
sole purpose of rendering him competent to stand trial for "non-
violent offenses" deprived Sell of an important liberty interest pro-
tected by the Due Process Clause.103 The Court held that, in prin-
ciple, the government may involuntarily medicate a mentally ill
defendant "facing serious criminal charges" for the sole purpose of
restoring trial competency. 0 4 With this holding, the Sell Court
unambiguously acknowledged that a state may premise its desire
to medicate a mentally ill detainee upon a motivation unrelated to
the individual's best medical interests. The Sell Court's holding is
a distinct and significant departure from the analysis in Harper,
in which the Court justified the involuntary medication of a con-
victed inmate for the purpose of mitigating his dangerous propen-
sity because the state's interest in maintaining safety within a
penal institution was closely related, if not identical, to Harper's
own personal therapeutic needs.105
In contrast with Harper, the Sell Court's holding established
the following four-prong test to determine whether involuntary
medication is appropriate in an individual case: 1) a state's peti-
tion to medicate must be in furtherance of an "important govern-
mental interestU;" 2) there must be a finding that involuntary
medication will "significantly further" the state's proffered inter-
est; 3) involuntary medication must be "necessary" to further the
state's proffered interest; and 4) the proposed medication must be
deemed "medically appropriate."0 6 Clearly, the Sell Court failed to
prescribe an unambiguous standard of review; rather, Sell appro-
103. Sell, 539 U.S. at 175.
104. Id. at 179.
105. Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 225-26 (1990). The Harper
Court further stated that the prison's institutional policy of involuntarily
medicating dangerous inmates was
a rational means of furthering the State's legitimate objec-
tives. Its exclusive application is to inmates who are mentally
ill and who, as a result of their illness, are gravely ill or repre-
sent a significant danger to themselves or others. The drugs
may be administered for no purpose other than treatment, and
only under the direction of a licensed psychiatrist.
Id. at 226 (emphasis added).
106. Sell, 539 U.S. at 179, 180-81.
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priates the terminology of both intermediate and strict scrutiny.10 7
Moreover, the Sell Court seems to concur with Justice Kennedy's
skepticism in Riggins regarding the ability of judges and physi-
cians to deal adequately with the deleterious consequences that
antipsychotic medication may have upon a pretrial detainee's
right to a fair trial.10 8
C. Establishing the Strength of the Government's Prosecutorial
Interest
Under the first prong of the Sell Court's test, a state must es-
tablish that its petition to medicate an individual is pursuant to
an important governmental interest.10 9 Here, the Sell Court seems
to define the weight of the government's prosecutorial interest un-
der the requirements of an intermediate scrutiny analysis. 110
Moreover, the Sell Court retreated from its prior statements in
Riggins that the involuntary medication of a pretrial detainee
107. See id. at 179:
[Tihe Constitution permits the Government involuntarily to
administer antipsychotic drugs to a mentally ill defendant fac-
ing serious criminal charges in order to render that defendant
competent to stand trial, but only if the treatment is medically
appropriate, is substantially unlikely to have side effects that
may undermine the fairness of the trial, and, taking account
of less intrusive alternatives, is necessary to further important
trial-related interests.
Id. (emphases added). The Court's use of the words "substantially" and 'im-
portant" appear to suggest an intermediate level analysis, while the phrase
"less intrusive alternatives" implicates the narrowly tailored prong of a strict
scrutiny analysis. See supra note 69.
108. See id. at 179. In Riggins, Justice Kennedy asserted his view that the
Constitution required the State, in each case, to prove that there was no sig-
nificant risk that the medication and its side effects would materially impair
the defendant's capacity to assist in his own defense. Riggins v. Nevada, 504
U.S. 127, 141 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring). He expressed "substantial
reservations that the State can make that showing." Id. Moreover, he called
the inquiry "illusive," and possibly something even experts would have diffi-
culty establishing, if it could be established at all. Id.
109. Sell, 539 U.S. at 180 ("First, a court must find that important gov-
ernmental interests are at stake.").
110. Cf. Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461 (1988) (stating that intermediate
scrutiny requires that classifications based on gender or illegitimacy must be
"substantially related to an important governmental objective") (emphasis
added); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976) (requiring that gender-based
classifications must further "important governmental objectives" in order to
pass muster under the Equal Protection Clause) (emphasis added).
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must further a "compelling" or "essential" state interest.1 1 1 By low-
ering the weight of the required governmental interest from "com-
pelling" or "essential" to "important," it appears that the Sell
Court capitulated to the Eighth Circuit's lower standard of
heightened scrutiny.112
The Sell Court concluded that the government presumptively
has an important interest in prosecuting serious crimes against
either persons or property."13 However, the Court provided no
guidance as to how lower courts should determine whether a
crime is serious enough to warrant involuntary medication in in-
dividual cases. Nonetheless, the Court does not challenge the
Eighth Circuit's conclusion that the charges of Medicaid and in-
surance fraud with which Sell faced could, in principle, be severe
enough to warrant involuntary medication."14 The Sell Court gives
much more deference to the government's prosecutorial interest
than the Riggins Court, for the Riggins Court simply rejected Ne-
vada's petition for involuntary medication while giving no consid-
eration to Nevada's interest in prosecuting a defendant charged
with capital murder.'5
Furthermore, in rejecting Sell's argument that a pretrial de-
tainee enjoys a fundamental right to be free from unwanted medi-
cation," 6 the Court reiterated its holding in Harper that an
incarcerated person has only a "significant liberty interest" in re-
111. See Riggins, 504 U.S. at 136, 138.
112. See United States v. Sell, 282 F.3d 560, 567 n.3 (8th Cir. 2002) ("[W]e
believe that we must apply some sort of heightened standard of review. .. ."),
vacated by 539 U.S. 166 (2003); see also Sell, 539 U.S. at 179 (describing the
four-pronged heightened standard of review that does not quite rise to the
level of strict scrutiny).
113. Sell, 539 U.S. at 180.
114. See id. (stating that while the government has an important interest
in bringing an individual accused of a serious crime to trial, the inquiry of
what is "serious" depends upon the circumstances, which "may lessen the im-
portance of that interest"); Sell, 282 F.3d at 568 (characterizing the sixty-two
charges of fraud and single charge of money-laundering against Sell as "seri-
ous," and implicating a "paramount" governmental interest in restoring Sell's
competency to stand trial). But see id. at 574 (Bye, C.J., dissenting) ("[Tihe
[Eighth Circuit] majority inexplicably turns a blind eye to the apparent
agreement of all parties that the fraud and money laundering charges alone
are insufficiently serious to warrant forcible medication.").
115. See Riggins, 504 U.S. at 138.
116. See Brief of Petitioner at 35-37, Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166
(2003) (No. 02-5664).
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fusing the administration of antipsychotic medication.1 7 The
Court's characterization of Sell's rights under due process as a
"significant liberty interest" is of great significance. In general, a
liberty interest that does not rise to the level of a "fundamental
right" can be overridden by a "legitimate" state interest. 118 In prior
cases involving the involuntary care and treatment of mentally ill
and disabled persons, the Court has consistently characterized the
right to refuse treatment as a mere "liberty interest," while refus-
ing to stamp such a right with the more lofty imprimatur of a
"fundamental right."119
By not labeling the right to refuse unwanted medical treat-
ment a "fundamental right," the Court has generally concluded
that the judiciary has a very limited role in determining the pre-
cise methods employed to care for the mentally ill because judges
are ill-equipped to second guess the decisions of trained profes-
sionals.1 20 Whenever the Court has found a mere "liberty interest"
to be at stake, rather than a "fundamental right," the treatment
decisions made by a state's officials have been granted an initial
117. Sell, 539 U.S. at 178 (quoting Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210,
221 (1990)).
118. See, e.g., Harper, 494 U.S. at 221-22, 225; Cruzan v. Mo. Dep't of
Health, 497 U.S. 261, 279 (1990); Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 321
(1982).
119. See, e.g., Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 278 ("The principle that a competent
person has a constitutionally protected liberty interest in refusing unwanted
medical treatment may be inferred from our prior decisions."); Youngberg,
457 U.S. at 318 (stating that in relation to a mentally retarded person insti-
tutionalized by the state, "there is a constitutionally protected liberty interest
in safety and freedom from restraint."); Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418,
425 (1979) ("This Court repeatedly has recognized that [involuntary] civil
commitment for any purpose constitutes a significant deprivation of liberty
that requires due process protection."); O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563,
580 (1975) ("There can be no doubt that involuntary commitment to a mental
hospital, like involuntary confinement of an individual for any reason, is a
deprivation of liberty which. . . must be justified on the basis of a legitimate
state interest.").
120. See Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 321-23.
In his concurring opinion in O'Connor v. Donaldson, Chief Justice
Burger suggested that the states are under no obligation whatsoever to pro-
vide treatment for civilly committed patients, concluding instead that the
state's police power in protecting society from the "significant antisocial acts"
of severely mentally ill persons obliges the states only to provide civilly com-
mitted patients with "a more humane place of confinement" than the old-
fashioned jails and poorhouses in which the mentally ill had been historically
confined. 422 U.S. at 582-83 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
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presumption of validity.' 2' In such cases, therefore, the Court's
initial attitude toward the aggrieved party's complaint has been
more dismissive than in cases where the Court has found the exis-
tence of a "fundamental" right.
Because a pretrial detainee's right to refuse unwanted medi-
cation under substantive due process is no greater than the amor-
phous "liberty interest" of a convicted inmate to refuse treatment
under Harper,122 it appears initially that a pretrial detainee is en-
titled to no greater level of judicial scrutiny than a reasonableness
standard.123 Similarly, under the Sell Court's analysis, the gov-
ernment's "important" interest in prosecuting a "serious crime" is
qualitatively similar to a state's "legitima[tel" and "importan[t]"
interest under Harper in medicating a dangerous inmate. 24 Con-
versely, in holding that a state must present a "compelling" or "es-
sential" interest in overriding a pretrial detainee's "liberty
interest" in refusing medication, 25 the Court in Riggins veered
away from its prior body of case law which simply required a state
to present a "legitimate" interest when seeking to infringe upon a
simple "liberty interest."' 26 Thus, by requiring only an "important"
governmental interest vis-d-vis a pretrial detainee's "liberty inter-
121. See, e.g., Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 323 (stating that courts should not
second-guess medical professionals who are better qualified than judges or
juries to make treatment decisions, and thus those professionals' decisions
are "presumptively valid"); see also Harper, 494 U.S. at 222-23:
The Policy under review requires the State to establish, by a
medical finding, that a mental disorder exists which is likely
to cause harm if not treated. Moreover, the fact that the medi-
cation must first be prescribed by a psychiatrist, and then ap-
proved by a reviewing psychiatrist, ensures that the
treatment in question will be ordered only if it is in the pris-
oner's medical interests, given the legitimate needs of his in-
stitutional confinement. These standards, which recognize
both the prisoner's medical interest and the State's interests,
meet the demands of the Due Process Clause.
Id.
122. Harper, 494 U.S. at 221.
123. See Khiem v. United States, 612 A.2d 160, 168-69 (D.C. 1992) (adopt-
ing the view that the government's petition to medicate a pretrial detainee
for the sole purpose of restoring trial competency is subject only to a review
for "arbitrary and capricious action").
124. See Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166, 180 (2003); Harper, 494 U.S.
at 225.
125. Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127, 136, 138 (1992).
126. See, e.g., Harper, 494 U.S. at 221, 225.
20041
188 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW[Vol.10:165
est,"127 the Sell Court, to some extent, corrected the anomaly cre-
ated by the Court's analysis in Riggins. This departure from
Riggins may lend even greater support to the proposition that the
scale has been tipped in favor of a standard of judicial scrutiny
which is generally deferential to the government's desire to ad-
minister medication to a mentally incompetent detainee.
It must be emphasized, however, that under Sell, a state is
required to present an important governmental interest before a
pre-trial detainee's liberty interest in avoiding medication can be
overridden for the purpose of restoring trial competency. 128 The
Sell Court reasoned that this is because a state's interest in prose-
cuting serious crime can, under certain circumstances, be dimin-
ished to such a degree as to eliminate the state's need for
involuntary medication altogether. 29 In particular, the Sell Court
concluded that a state's prosecutorial interest can be diminished
by the likelihood that the defendant could be subjected to future
confinement under a civil commitment statute in lieu of a criminal
trial. 130 Although the Court acknowledged that "civil commitment
is [not] a substitute for a criminal trial,"131 this was a victory for
Sell because the Court clearly rejected the government's conten-
tion that medicating a mentally incompetent pretrial detainee for
the purpose of restoring trial competency was the only method of
satisfying the government's prosecutorial interests. 32
Although the alternative of civil commitment may protect a
pretrial detainee's liberty interest in bodily integrity, the Sell
Court's analysis may be flawed as it pertains to the defendant's
liberty interest in being free from physical confinement. Indeed,
an individual who is confined under a civil commitment statute
can be confined indefinitely as long as he poses a danger to him-
127. See Sell, 539 U.S. at 180.
128. See id.
129. Id.
130. Id. In addition to the likelihood of indefinite confinement under a
civil commitment regime, the Sell Court also suggested that the government's
prosecutorial interest may be diminished if the detainee was already confined
for a significant period of time for which he would receive credit toward the
imposed sentence upon conviction. Id.
131. Id.
132. See Brief for the United States (Respondent) at 24-26, Sell v. United
States, 539 U.S. 166 (2003) (No. 02-5664); accord United States v. Weston,
255 F.3d 873, 881-82 (D.C. Cir. 2001); United States v. Gomes, 289 F.3d 71,
81 (2d Cir. 2002).
FIT TO BE TRIED
self or others if left unsupervised in the community. 133 Therefore,
a pretrial detainee who is subjected to civil commitment in lieu of
a criminal trial could conceivably be confined for a longer period of
time than would have otherwise been the case if the criminal
charges had been adjudicated at trial.134 In addition, some may ob-
ject to the notion of transforming the nation's psychiatric hospitals
into repositories for the warehousing of mentally incompetent
criminal defendants simply because they cannot be brought to
trial. However, by refusing to hold that civilly committed patients
have a constitutional "right to treatment,"' 35 the Court has consis-
tently viewed civil commitment solely as a legal instrument by
which states may confine and control individuals who have been
found to pose a danger to the community by reason of a mental
illness or disability. 36 Therefore, it comes as no surprise that the
Sell Court regarded indefinite confinement under a civil commit-
ment regime as a reasonable alternative to the state's interest in
punishing criminal acts through incarceration. 137
In sum, Sell requires lower courts to employ a form of inter-
mediate scrutiny in weighing the severity of an alleged crime
against the likelihood that a state's prosecutorial interests could
be adequately satisfied through a civil commitment regime. 38 Al-
though the Court was deliberate in not limiting the option of in-
voluntary medication only to allegations of violent crimes, 139 lower
133. See O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 575-76 (1975); see also 18
U.S.C. § 4246 (2000) (regulating hospitalization of an inmate due for release
from prison but suffering from mental disease or defect).
134. See Brief for the United States (Respondent) at 26, Sell v. United
States, 539 U.S. 166 (2003) (No. 02-5664) (arguing that allowing courts to
take the likelihood of involuntary confinement under a civil commitment
statute into consideration in weighing the government's prosecutorial inter-
ests in involuntarily medicating that inmate to restore trial competence could
cause many mentally ill defendants to be "warehoused indefinitely").
135. See O'Connor, 422 U.S. at 573 ("Specifically, there is no reason now to
decide whether mentally ill persons dangerous to themselves or to others
have a right to treatment upon compulsory confinement by the State, or
whether the State may compulsorily confine a non-dangerous, mentally ill
individual for the purpose of treatment.").
136. See id. at 573-74, 576; Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 425-26
(1979).
137. See Sell, 539 U.S. at 180.
138. See id. at 179.
139. Id. at 180 (holding that the government has an important interest in
prosecuting "serious" crimes against either the "person" or against "prop-
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courts may not simply defer to a state's cursory assertion that any
felony charge would categorically warrant involuntary medica-
tion. 140 Despite the fact that Sell had a mere "liberty interest," as
opposed to a "fundamental right," in avoiding unwanted medica-
tion, 141 a state must present something more than a "legitimate"
state policy before it can compel a mentally ill defendant to accept
an unwanted medication. 142 As was the case in Riggins, the Sell
Court's analysis departs from prior holdings in which a simple
"liberty interest" could be outweighed by a "legitimate" state pol-
icy, although the Sell Court does not go so far as to require an "es-
sential" or "compelling" interest. 143
Although it appears initially that the Sell Court simply
adopted a form of intermediate scrutiny, the two prongs of the
Court's analysis discussed below may suggest something more.
During the remainder of its analysis, the Sell Court struggled
with the perceived inability of both judges and prison psychia-
trists to manage the often debilitating side effects associated with
most forms of antipsychotic medication, thus increasing the likeli-
hood of unfair prejudice at trial.'" Possibly as a result of this, the
Sell Court injected elements of strict scrutiny into its analysis,
while relying upon Justice Kennedy's extremely skeptical view in
Harper regarding whether trial prejudice could ever be averted
whenever a state involuntarily medicates a mentally incompetent
defendant. 14
erty"). But cf Brief of Petitioner at 41, Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166(2003) (No. 02-5664) ("The government's interest is lessened even further be-
cause the government's only basis for medicating Dr. Sell is the government's
belief that Dr. Sell is guilty of non-violent crimes, involving only economic
losses.") (emphasis added).
140. For an example of one such cursory assertion made by the govern-
ment in a case, see Brief for the United States (Respondent) at 24, Sell v.
United States, 539 U.S. 166 (2003) (No. 02-5664) (arguing that the govern-
ment has a "compelling" interest in adjudicating and convicting felonies).
141. Sell, 539 U.S. at 178.
142. See id. at 179 (requiring the state to meet a series of inquiries before
permissibly administering antipsychotic drugs involuntarily to mentally ill
defendants facing serious criminal charges in order to render the defendants
competent to stand trial).
143. See Sell, 539 U.S. at 178-79.
144. See id. at 179.
145. See id.; see also Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127, 140-42 (1992) (Ken-
nedy, J., concurring).
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D. Preserving the Right to a Fair Trial
Assuming that a state has presented an important govern-
mental interest in restoring trial competency, the second prong of
the Sell test requires a court to find that involuntary medication
will significantly further the state's interest.146 Accordingly, the
government must show that the proposed medication is "substan-
tially likely to render the defendant competent to stand trial."147 In
describing this second prong of the test, the Sell Court cited with
approval a portion of Justice Kennedy's lengthy concurrence in
Riggins,148 in which he explicitly described the ways in which the
side effects of antipsychotic medication can adversely effect a de-
fendant's in-court demeanor, his abilities to react to the proceed-
ings, testify on his own behalf, and communicate with counsel. 149
As such, Justice Kennedy's concurrence in Riggins is highly in-
structive in predicting how lower courts should apply Sell in re-
solving petitions for the involuntary medication of pretrial
detainees.
The substance of Justice Kennedy's thesis in Riggins is that
medical and pharmacological data suggests that the involuntary
medication of mentally ill defendants would entail "a serious
threat to a defendant's right to a fair trial."150 Hence, granting a
state the power to medicate a pretrial detainee would, in effect,
enable prosecutors to manipulate the defendant's demeanor in a
manner that would "prejudice all facets of the defense."15' Under
Justice Kennedy's analysis, therefore, a state bears an almost in-
surmountable burden of proving that a proposed medication is not
only efficacious, but also that the side effects from the medication
will not impair the defendant's opportunity to receive a fair
trial.5 2 Conversely, the Eighth Circuit, when confronted with the
146. Sell, 539 U.S. at 181 ("Second, the court must conclude that involun-
tary medication will significantly further those concomitant state interests.").
147. Id. (emphasis added).
148. See id.
149. See Riggins, 504 U.S. at 142-45 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
150. Id. at 138.
151. Id. at 142.
152. Id. at 141. Justice Kennedy stated:
[E]lementary protections against state intrusion require the
State in every case to make a showing that there is no signifi-
cant risk that the medication will impair or alter in any mate-
rial way the defendant's capacity or willingness to react to the
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issue in Sell, concluded that issues of possible trial prejudice
would be best resolved after the medication had been adminis-
tered, 153 with no real concern paid to the possible side effects and
their burden on ensuring a fair trial. Due to the tremendous
weight accorded by the Sell Court to Justice Kennedy's analysis in
Riggins,54 the Supreme Court rejected the Eighth Circuit's "wait
and see" approach with respect to a state's duty to protect a medi-
cated defendant from unfair prejudice at trial. 155 Moreover, the
Sell Court criticized the lower courts for simply deferring to the
conclusions proffered by Sell's prison psychiatrists that the bene-
fits of involuntary medication would presumably outweigh the po-
tential risks, despite the likelihood of significant side effects.1 56
E. The Intrusiveness of Involuntary Medication
Under the third prong of the Sell analysis, a court must find
that "involuntary medication is necessary to further [the state's]
interests" in bringing the defendant to trial. 157 Here, the Court af-
firmed its prior hypothesis in Riggins that a state could, in princi-
ple, medicate a pretrial detainee for the sole purpose of restoring
trial competency. 158 However, considering the Court's reliance
upon Justice Kennedy's concurrence in Riggins regarding the per-
ils associated with forcibly medicating pretrial detainees, the over-
all contour of the Supreme Court's analysis does not appear to be
testimony at trial or to assist his counsel. Based on my under-
standing of the medical literature, I have substantial reserva-
tions that the State can make such a showing .... These
uncertainties serve to underscore the difficult terrain the
State must traverse when it enters this domain.
Id.
153. United States v. Sell, 282 F.3d 560, 572 (8th Cir. 2002), vacated by
539 U.S. 166 (2003).
154. The fact that the Sell Court cites to Justice Kennedy's concurrence in
Riggins on four separate occasions is indicative of the significance accorded to
Justice Kennedy's analysis in Riggins. See Sell, 539 U.S. at 179, 181, 182,
185.
155. See id. at 181 (holding that in order for the involuntary medication to
pass constitutional muster, the court must conclude that involuntary "ad-
ministration of drugs is substantially unlikely to have side effects that would
interfere significantly with the defendant's ability to assist counsel in con-
ducting a trial defense.").
156. Id. at 185.
157. Id. at 181.
158. See id. at 178-79; Riggins, 504 U.S. at 135.
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be consistent with the Eighth Circuit's optimism that Sell's prison
psychiatrists could easily manage whatever adverse side effects he
might experience during trial.159 Rather, the Sell analysis seems
to be more aligned with the Sixth Circuit's holding in Brandon
that the Riggins standard required some sort of "narrow tailoring"
test which is more akin to strict scrutiny.160 Thus, this third prong
suggests that although a state need only present an important
governmental interest in restoring trial competency,1 61 the state
must nonetheless prove that involuntary medication is narrowly
tailored to the accomplishment of its prosecutorial interests.1 62
Sell's failure to establish an easily identifiable standard of re-
view may have worrisome implications for lower courts seeking
guidance. Sell seems to stand for the proposition that lower courts
must use a level of vigilance and judicial intervention that is more
akin to strict scrutiny as it pertains to the preservation of a men-
tally incompetent detainee's trial-related rights. 63 However, lower
courts may continue to apply something akin to intermediate
scrutiny insofar as it relates only to a state's assertion that the
circumstances of an alleged crime could, in theory, override an in-
dividual's liberty interest in avoiding unwanted medication. By
stringing together elements of intermediate and strict scrutiny,1 64
the Sell Court struggles to strike a compromise between the gov-
ernment's "compelling interest in finding, convicting, and punish-
ing those who violate the law,"165 and the unquestioned duty of the
courts to protect a criminal defendant's fundamental right to a fair
trial from the "deleterious" side effects of antipsychotic drugs. 166
159. See Sell v. United States, 282 F.3d 560, 571-72 (8th Cir. 2002), va-
cated by 539 U.S. 166 (2003).
160. See United States v. Brandon, 158 F.3d 947, 960 (6th Cir. 1998).
161. See Sell, 539 U.S. at 180.
162. See id. at 181. Under traditional notions of intermediate scrutiny,
states would only be required to show that involuntary medication was "sub-
stantially related" to an important governmental interest. See, e.g., Craig v.
Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976).
163. See Sell, 539 U.S. at 179.
164. See id.
165. See Brief for the United States (Respondent) at 19, Sell v. United
States, 539 U.S. 166 (2003) (No. 02-5664) (quoting Moran v. Burbine, 475
U.S. 412, 426 (1986)).
166. See Brief of Petitioner at 46, Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166
(2003) (No. 02-5664) (quoting Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 504 (1976)).
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F. Medical Appropriateness
Finally, the fourth prong of the Sell test requires a finding
that the proposed drugs used would be medically appropriate.167
Under this final step of the analysis, a court must evaluate the
proposed medication in relation to the defendant's specific medical
condition in order to weigh the probability of efficacy against the
severity of likely side effects. 168 Because the nature and severity of
side effects vary with the type of drug used,1 69 the Sell Court im-
plicitly endorsed Sell's contention that the government cannot
medicate him without first informing the trial court as to the ex-
act drug it intends to administer. 70
The Sell Court's "medical appropriateness" prong begs the
question as to the extent a prison psychiatrist's medical judgment
may be improperly influenced by a state's interest in bringing a
mentally incompetent detainee to trial.' 7' In an attempt to ac-
commodate a state's prosecutorial interest, for example, a prison
psychiatrist may propose to administer a drug with fewer imme-
diate side effects (thereby enabling the state to bring the defen-
dant to trial without the court finding a risk of unfair prejudice),
despite the availability of an alternative drug more appropriate
for the patient's long-term psychiatric condition, but yielding more
immediate side effects. The Sell Court's analysis does nothing to
dissuade prison psychiatrists from conspiring with prosecutors to
167. Sell, 539 U.S. at 181 ("Fourth,... the court must conclude that ad-
ministration of the drugs is medically appropriate, i.e., in the patient's best
medical interest in light of his medical condition."); accord Riggins v. Nevada,
504 U.S. 127, 133 (1992); Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 227 (1990).
168. See Sell, 539 U.S. at 181.
169. Id.
170. See id. (holding that the court must conclude that administration of
antipsychotic drugs is medically appropriate based upon the defendant's
medical condition and that the drugs are necessary to further the state pur-
pose of rendering the defendant competent to stand trial); Brief of Petitioner
at 49, Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166 (2003) (No. 02-5664) (noting the
court's obligation to conclude that administration of medication is "necessary
and appropriate" and arguing that "[c]ertainly, a showing of medical appro-
priateness requires that the government provide the Court... with the name
and proposed dosage of the antipsychotic drug to be administered").
171. See Joanmarie Ilaria Davoli, Still Stuck in the Cuckoo's Nest: Why Do
Courts Continue to Rely on Antiquated Mental Illness Research?, 69 TENN. L.
REV. 987, 1046-49 (2002) (commenting on the various conflicts of interest that
ensue whenever a psychiatrist's treatment decisions are influenced by the le-
gal strategies of both prosecutors and defense counsel).
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jeopardize a mentally ill patient's long-term mental condition by
prescribing a particular drug for the sole and immediate purpose
of hauling that person into a courtroom. 172
G. The Strong Presumption Against Medicating to Restore Trial
Competency
Despite its failure to prescribe a consistent standard of judi-
cial review, 173 the Sell Court's opinion will force many lower courts
to reconsider their previous rulings regarding the circumstances
under which the government may involuntarily medicate pretrial
detainees. Although the Sell majority gave little consideration to
the detainee's "liberty interest" in avoiding unwanted medica-
tion,174 any state that wishes to medicate a pretrial detainee is
burdened with the initial presumption that the involuntary ad-
ministration of antipsychotic drugs will entail a "substantial prob-
ability of trial prejudice." 175 Moreover, in his concurrence in
Riggins, Justice Kennedy was explicitly doubtful about whether a
state could ever present a set of circumstances under which its in-
terest in bringing a criminal defendant to trial would outweigh the
danger of trial prejudice inherent within the administration of an-
tipsychotic medication. 176 Considering the extent to which Justice
Kennedy's pessimism was adopted by the majority in Sell,177 as
172. On the other hand, "[a] standard that requires forced psychiatric
treatment only be available when the motivation is purely therapeutic elimi-
nates the situation in which the government is requesting treatment in order
to achieve its own goals of prosecution or execution instead of out of concern
for the afflicted individual." Id. at 1049. This danger is inherent in situations
where the prosecution wishes to medicate a defendant for the sole purpose of
restoring his or her competency to stand trial. The motivation in such cases is
purely selfish, in that the state wants an opportunity to convict the defen-
dant, and likely is motivated very little, if at all, by concerns for the defen-
dant's mental well-being.
173. See Sell, 539 U.S. at 179 (establishing a standard utilizing aspects of
both intermediate level and strict scrutiny review); supra notes 159-165 and
accompanying text.
174. See Sell, 539 U.S. at 179 (setting a standard of review that does not
specifically require inquiry into the defendant's liberty interest).
175. See Riggins, 504 U.S. 127, 138 (1991).
176. See id. at 141 (Kennedy, J., concurring); supra note 55 and accompa-
nying text.
177. See Sell, 539 U.S. at 180 ("This standard will permit involuntary ad-
ministration of drugs solely for trial competence purposes in certain in-
stances. But those instances may be rare.") (emphasis added).
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well as the Court's conclusion that the likelihood of civil commit-
ment can greatly diminish the government's need to bring a de-
fendant to trial,178 the Sell Court's analysis suggests that trial
competency alone is an allowable, yet disfavored, rationale for in-
voluntarily medicating a pretrial detainee who poses no danger to
himself or others.
H. The Dangers of Pretextuality
The most troubling aspect of the Sell Court's opinion is the
Court's recommendation that in all cases involving pretrial de-
tainees, states should first seek permission to medicate an indi-
vidual for dangerousness under the Harper standard before
seeking to medicate on the grounds of restoring trial compe-
tency. 179 The Court's suggestion was premised upon its belief that
determining a detainee's dangerousness is "more objective and
manageable" than the more precarious and unpredictable inquiry
into a proposed medication's impact on a detainee's right to a fair
trial.180
As argued above, Sell seems to stand for the proposition that
a state bears the heavy burden of producing specific evidence to
prove that the involuntary medication of a pretrial detainee will
not impinge upon the detainee's right to a fair trial. 81 This propo-
sition, however, is severely undermined by the Sell Court's proce-
dural recommendation that a state should first seek to medicate a
pretrial detainee for dangerousness under Harper;'82 such a pro-
cedure appears to presume that treating a dangerous inmate and
restoring trial competency are interchangeable state interests. 8 3
In fact, dangerousness and trial competency are not inter-
178. Id.
179. See id. at 183; see also Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 227
(1990) (holding that the Due Process Clause allows a state to medicate a
mentally ill inmate after finding that the inmate is "dangerous to himself or
others and [that] the treatment is in the inmate's medical interest").
180. Sell, 539 U.S. at 182.
181. See supra Part III.G.
182. See Sell, 539 U.S. at 183; see also Harper, 494 U.S. at 227.
183. But see Sell, 539 U.S. at 181-83. Noting the difference between the
two inquiries - whether to medicate a pretrial detainee to pacify or to restore
competency - the Court justified requiring a court to, as a threshold question,
"determine whether the Government seeks, or has first sought, permission
for forced administration of drugs on these other Harper-type [or dangerous-
ness] grounds; and if not, why not." Id. at 183.
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changeable interests, as evidenced by the Sell Court's own conclu-
sion that the lower courts had improperly relied upon the govern-
ment's attempt to conflate the issues of dangerousness and trial
competency into a single inquiryl&4 The question of whether an
inmate is dangerous to himself or others under Harper is different
than the question of whether medication should be administered
to render a defendant competent for trial because a finding of
dangerousness under Harper is subject only to a rational basis
test, in which courts must give significant deference to a state's
findings of dangerousness. 8 5 The Harper rational basis standard
is markedly different and a much lower burden to carry than the
Sell Court's intermediate-strict hybrid standard of review.18 6 Con-
sequently, the Sell Court's procedural recommendation does noth-
ing to remedy the danger that courts may continue to obscure the
important distinctions between a state's interest in mitigating
dangerousness and its interest in restoring trial competency.
Most regrettably, the Court may have empowered prosecutors
to use the deferential standard of review in Harper as a conven-
ient pretext to have a pretrial detainee medicated for dangerous-
ness when the true motive is the restoration of trial competency. 8 7
Notably, one way that courts may be able to discourage states
from misusing Harper in such a way is by strictly limiting the in-
quiry of the detainee's alleged dangerousness to the immediate
184. See id. at 183-85.
185. Harper, 494 U.S. at 226-27.
186. See id. at 227 (holding that the Due Process Clause allows a state to
medicate a mentally ill inmate after finding that the inmate is "dangerous to
himself or others and [that] the treatment is in the inmate's medical inter-
est"); Sell, 539 U.S. at 179, 180-81 (setting forth a four-pronged test for
whether a pretrial detainee may be involuntarily medicated to restore his or
her competence to stand trial).
187. A prosecutor may easily attempt to medicate a defendant under a
claim that he or she is dangerous to herself or others, especially with the help
of state-employed prison psychiatrists to testify that the medication is needed
for its calming effect. Moreover, the Court would welcome this initial claim,
and based upon its opinion in Sell, apparently the Court would prefer that
prosecutors try the dangerousness claim before using the possibility of ren-
dering the defendant competent to stand trial as a justification for involun-
tary medication. See Sell, 539 U.S. at 183 (requiring courts asked to permit
forcible administration of antipsychotic drugs to first inquire into whether
the prosecution has made a claim that the medication is necessary due to the
defendant's dangerous propensities, and to ask why the prosecution has not
made such a claim when it fails to do so).
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conditions of incarceration.
I. Defining Dangerousness Under Sell and Harper
Perhaps the most critical issue facing lower courts is the ex-
tent to which a state's finding that a pretrial detainee is danger-
ous under the Harper standard may be improperly used to
circumvent the heightened levels of scrutiny required by Sell.188 In
particular, courts must be aware that governmental officials have,
in the past, frequently used a mentally incompetent detainee's
-prior history of aggressive behavior outside the current conditions
of incarceration as a primary basis to seek involuntary medication
under the Harper dangerousness standard. 189 When a detainee's
acts prior to incarceration are used as a basis to justify involun-
tary medication under Harper, the detainee can be burdened with
an almost overwhelming presumption of dangerousness. 90 All the
prosecution would need to do to satisfy Harper is to find some
events in the defendant's past, no matter how distant, that tend to
show the defendant's propensity for dangerousness. '91
The problem with this tactic is obvious. The only real value in
such evidence is to show how dangerous the defendant may have
been in the past, which presumably has nothing to do with
whether the defendant should be involuntarily medicated under
188. See id. at 179.
189. See, e.g., Morgan v. Rabun, 128 F.3d 694, 698 (8th Cir. 1997) (finding
that the defendant was dangerous based in part upon the nature of the crime
that led to his commitment and his hostile demeanor when institutionalized
in a hospital); United States v. Weston, 134 F. Supp. 2d 115, 130 (D.D.C.
2001) (basing a finding of Weston's dangerousness upon, in part, his past vio-
lent behavior), affd on other grounds, 225 F.3d 873 (D.C. Cir. 2001); United
States v. Keeven, 115 F. Supp. 2d 1132, 1135-36 (E.D. Mo. 2000) (involving
an Involuntary Medication Report based partly upon a mentally incompetent
detainee's history of aggressive behavior prior to incarceration and hostility
toward her own attorneys which sought to justify involuntary medication
upon the detainee's "profound psychosis resulting in loss of judgment, in-
creased aggression and potential assaultive behavior.").
190. See, e.g., Morgan, 128 F.3d at 698 (using detainee's prior violent acts,
including the alleged crime leading to commitment, as a basis to affirm a
staff psychiatrist's decision to medicate); Donaldson v. Denver, 847 P.2d 632,
633-35 (Colo. 1993) (holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
using a mentally incompetent detainee's prior history of aggressive behavior
as a basis to conclude that involuntary medication was necessary to mitigate
the detainee's dangerousness).
191. See Harper, 494 U.S. at 227.
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his current conditions of incarceration. A state may attempt to
medicate a mentally incompetent detainee although the detainee
has not shown a proclivity to assault prison staff or fellow inmates
during the course of incarceration, or even if the inmate has been
completely segregated from the general prison population.192 If
prosecutors and prison officials are permitted to use prior violent
acts (such as the alleged crime of the prison detainee) as a pri-
mary basis for involuntary medication under Harper, they may be
able to circumvent the first prong of the Sell Court's test requiring
the state to establish that its petition to medicate an individual is
pursuant to an important governmental interest.193 When the gov-
ernment's true interest is to medicate the defendant to render him
or her competent to stand trial, and not to medicate to ameliorate
a defendant's dangerousness, using prior violent acts as a basis to
medicate pretrial detainees belies the first prong of Sell by not
permitting the court to determine whether the government's true
interest is an "important" one. 94
Because the Sell Court suggested that all petitions for invol-
untary medication should first be examined under Harper,95 the
extent to which lower courts might consider a mentally incompe-
tent detainee's prior propensity for violent behavior is crucial in
determining whether prosecutors will be more or less inclined to
use Harper as a pretext to medicate for dangerousness when the
ultimate purpose may be simply to restore trial competency. 96 To
prevent prosecutors from using the rational basis test in Harper
192. Although overruled on appeal to the D.C. Circuit, the District Court's
ruling in United States. v. Weston is illustrative of a lower court's susceptibil-
ity to entertaining presumably irrelevant evidence of dangerousness despite a
defendant's isolated incarceration pending trial. Weston, 134 F. Supp. 2d at
129-30 (using defendant's prior violent acts as a basis to approve the govern-
ment's involuntary medication petition under Harper, despite the fact that
Weston was held in isolation). But see Weston, 255 F.3d at 878-79 (holding
that defendant's complete seclusion from the general prison population pre-
cluded a finding of dangerousness under Harper, but that he nonetheless
could be medicated to restore trial competency).
193. See Sell, 539 U.S. at 180.
194. See id.
195. Id. at 183.
196. See Donaldson v. Denver, 847 P.2d 632, 636 (Colo. 1993) (Scott, J.,
dissenting) (disputing the state's contention that involuntary medication was
for the purpose of preventing a gross deterioration in the defendant's condi-
tion and concluding instead that the "total goal" was to restore trial compe-
tency).
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as a means to circumvent the requirements of heightened scrutiny
required by Sell, courts should be careful not to confuse the issue
of dangerousness under Harper with that under a civil commit-
ment procedure. A mentally ill person's prior propensity for vio-
lence would be relevant in a civil commitment hearing because the
threshold question is whether the person should be institutional-
ized because he otherwise poses a significant danger to himself or
others while left unsupervised in the community. 197 In contrast,
the inquiry under Harper is more narrow because courts are only
required to determine whether the detainee poses a danger to
himself or others exclusively within the detainee's current condi-
tions of incarceration. 198
As such, a state has a rational basis justification for involun-
tarily medicating an inmate under Harper only if the court finds
that the methods employed within a particular facility for control-
ling violent behavior are insufficient to prevent the detainee from
harming himself or others within the facility.199 To determine
whether a particular facility is equipped to control a mentally ill
inmate's behavior, a court should narrow the scope of its inquiry
to whether the inmate poses an immediate threat to the prison's
psychiatrists, staff, and other inmates within the institution, and
whether prison officials have attempted to control the inmate's
197. See O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 576 (1975).
198. See Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 227 (1990); see also Sell, 539
U.S. at 174-75. The Sell Court accepted the District Court's determination of
Sell's dangerousness after noting the District Court had "limited its determi-
nation to Sell's 'dangerousness at this [present] time to himself and to those
around him in his institutional context.'" Id. The Court in Harper stated:
We hold that, given the requirements of the prison environ-
ment, the Due Process Clause permits the State to treat a
prison inmate who has a serious mental illness with antipsy-
chotic drugs against his will, if the inmate is dangerous to
himself or others and the treatment is in the inmate's medical
interest.
Harper, 494 U.S. at 227 (emphasis added).
The Supreme Court premised its holding in Harper upon prior cases
in which the Court found that the unique exigencies of maintaining safety
within a penal institution justified the infringement of an inmate's individual
liberty interest, such as the right to avoid bodily restraints, or even the right
to marry. See id. at 223-27.
199. See United States v. Weston, 255 F.3d 873, 879 (D.C. Cir. 2001) ("Ab-
sent a showing that Weston's condition now exceeds the institution's ability
to contain it through his present state of confinement, the prior decision ap-
pears to preclude a finding of dangerousness.").
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behavior through non-drug alternatives. This limited inquiry will
better insure that a state's finding of dangerousness is truly de-
serving of the lower standard of review under Harper, and is not
merely a Trojan horse used to circumvent the searching inquiry
required under Sell into an incompetent detainee's prospect of re-
ceiving a fair trial while under the influence of a potent psychiat-
ric drug. Evidence of alleged violent acts occurring before the
inmate was imprisoned, perhaps occurring in an unsupervised set-
ting, is not likely to be probative in determining whether a men-
tally ill detainee poses a danger to himself or others in a prison
facility, where the detainee's propensity for violence may be suc-
cessfully supervised and controlled through the use of isolation or
other non-drug alternatives.
IV. PAVING THE WAY TO THE DEATH CHAMBER
The need for courts to construe Harper narrowly does not only
apply to cases in which a state wishes to use antipsychotic medi-
cation as a means of restoring trial competency. Indeed, perhaps
the most egregious use of the rational basis test of Harper would
be if a state employed the rationale of dangerousness as a pretext
to render a mentally incompetent condemned inmate fit for execu-
tion. Because life on death row often exacerbates the symptoms of
mental illness, thereby rendering many otherwise competent in-
mates incompetent, 200 there remains after Sell a legitimate fear
that some states may seek to use the rational basis test of Harper
as a means to circumvent the Supreme Court's prohibition against
executing the mentally insane.201
200. See, e.g., Roberta M. Harding, "Endgame:" Competency and the Exe-
cution of Condemned Inmates -A Proposal to Satisfy the Eighth Amendment's
Prohibition Against the Infliction of Cruel and Unusual Punishment, 14 ST.
LouIs U. PUB. L. REV. 105, 115-16 (1994).
Any individual condemned to face execution must have been tried
and sentenced. In such previous judicial proceedings, the condemned
individual must have been determined to be competent or else such
proceedings would have been suspended until competency was
achieved. Therefore, for the issue of competency to face execution to
surface, the condemned individual must have become incompetent
following his death sentence.
Keith Alan Byers, Incompetency, Execution, and the Use of Antipsychotic
Drugs, 47 ARK. L. REV. 361, 366-67 (1994) (citations omitted).
201. See Harding, supra note 200, at 122-25. The Supreme Court ex-
pressly prohibited the execution of the mentally insane in 1986. See Ford v.
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The seminal case concerning the medicate-to-execute question
is State v. Perry,20 2 in which the Supreme Court of Louisiana re-
fused to allow state officials to use a Harper finding of dangerous-
ness as a justification to medicate a condemned mentally
incompetent inmate.2 3 Although Perry was ultimately decided
upon state constitutional grounds, 20 4 the Louisiana Supreme
Court regarded the state's petition to medicate under Harper as a
cynical ploy to use an alleged concern for the inmate's health and
safety as a mere pretext to render him mentally fit for execu-
tion.205 If the Perry rationale is not adopted by other courts, invol-
untary medication of inmates awaiting the death penalty to
render them competent to carry out their sentence is not an uni-
maginable possibility. Furthermore, after Sell, state officials may
no longer even need to use Harper as a pretext to conceal their
true motives when seeking to medicate condemned inmates.
Rather, state officials may actually find it easier to gain judicial
approval under Sell in cases involving the involuntary medication
of condemned inmates than in cases involving pretrial detainees.
To understand how Sell might impact the lives of mentally in-
competent inmates who are currently residing on death row, one
must first look briefly to the Supreme Court's original prohibition
against executing the mentally insane. The Supreme Court, in
Ford v. Wainwright,20 6 held that executing the mentally insane
violates the prohibition of the Eighth Amendment against cruel
and unusual punishment. 2 7 Although the Ford Court held that
Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 410 (1986) ("The Eighth Amendment prohibits the
State from inflicting the penalty of death upon a prisoner who is insane.").
202. 610 So. 2d 746 (La. 1992).
203. Id. at 755.
204. Id.
205. See id. at 754. The Louisiana Supreme Court stated:
It is obvious that none of the participants considered that
prison safety or the long term best medical interests of Perry
were significant or determinative issues in the proceeding.
Having conducted this proceeding with the single-minded
purpose of forcibly medicating Perry in order to execute
him,. . . the state cannot now contend that it genuinely seeks
to uphold the trial court's forced medication order merely to
further Perry's best medical interest and the safety of Perry
and others in the prison setting.
Id.
206. 477 U.S. 399 (1986).
207. Id. at 410.
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states may not execute a prisoner who is "insane,"208 the Court de-
clined to establish any required procedure or criteria in determin-
ing whether a condemned inmate is mentally fit for execution. 20 9
The only guidance provided by the Court came in the form of a
proposition from Justice Powell's concurrence that the Eighth
Amendment allows the states to execute only those who "know the
fact of their impending execution and the reason for it."210 Subse-
quently, this statement from Justice Powell's concurrence became
commonly known as the "cognitive test," and was adopted by
many states as the sole criteria in determining a condemned in-
mate's eligibility for execution.211 In addition to adopting the cog-
nitive test, however, some jurisdictions have held that a
condemned inmate is death eligible only if he can effectively com-
municate with counsel, an additional requirement know as the
"assistance prong."212
The disparate interpretations of Ford will have a significant
impact upon how Sell is applied in cases involving the involuntary
medication of condemned inmates. As argued above, 21 3 the Sell
Court essentially created a two-tiered standard of review: courts
must first apply intermediate scrutiny to determine whether a
state's prosecutorial interest is important enough in a particular
case to outweigh an individual's liberty interest to refuse un-
wanted medication, followed by a form of strict scrutiny to ensure
that the side effects of a proposed medication would not signifi-
cantly impact an individual's ability to communicate with counsel,
or otherwise result in unfair trial prejudice. 214 The rationale for
incorporating the "assistance prong" into an inquiry regarding a
condemned inmate's mental fitness for execution is that it is im-
208. Id.
209. See id. at 416-17 ("[W~e leave to the State the task of developing ap-
propriate ways to enforce the constitutional restriction upon its execution of
sentences.").
210. Id. at 422 (Powell, J., concurring).
211. See e.g., Singleton v. State, 437 S.E.2d 53, 56 (S.C. 1993) (citing
Johnson v. Cabana, 818 F.2d 333 (5th Cir. 1981)).
212. See id. at 56-57 (citing authorities and stating that "[oither states
have adopted similar views where, in order to execute a defendant, he must
have the intelligence to convey any knowledge of a fact which would make his
punishment unjust or unlawful to his attorney.").
213. See supra Part III.B.
214. See supra Parts III.A.-F.; see also Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166,
179 (2003).
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perative that a condemned inmate can assist counsel throughout
the post-conviction appeals process. 215 In a jurisdiction that has
incorporated this "assistance prong" into its analysis, the potential
side effects of a proposed drug would be crucial in determining
whether involuntary medication would render a condemned in-
mate death eligible under Ford.216 As such, under the assistance
prong a condemned inmate would be entitled to the same judicial
protections as a pretrial detainee under Sell, thus triggering strict
scrutiny in order to ensure that involuntary medication would not
impair a condemned inmate's ability to participate effectively
throughout the appeals process. Because of the Supreme Court's
current pessimism regarding the ability of psychiatrists to miti-
gate the side effects commonly associated with antipsychotic
drugs,217 it is highly unlikely that a court bound by the "assistance
prong" would approve a state's request to medicate a condemned
inmate. However, in the wake of the Eighth Circuit's holding in
Singleton v. Norris,21s the results will be starkly different in juris-
dictions that ascribe solely to the "cognitive test."219
Several months prior to the Supreme Court's holding in Sell,
the Eighth Circuit, in Singleton v. Norris, affirmed a district
court's order permitting the State of Arkansas to execute a con-
demned inmate who had been previously restored to competency
through involuntary medication under a Harper finding of dan-
gerousness. 220 Beginning with the premise that the state's interest
in punishing crime is "at its greatest in the narrow class of capital
murder cases in which the aggravating factors justify imposition
of the death penalty,"221 the Eighth Circuit concluded that invol-
215. See Singleton, 437 S.E.2d at 57-58.
216. See Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127, 140-42 (1992) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring); see also Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 410 (1986).
217. See, e.g., supra note 56 and accompanying text.
218. See Singleton v. Norris, 319 F.3d 1018, 1020 (8th Cir. 2003) (affirm-
ing the district court's rejection of defendant "Singleton's contention that the
administration of mandatory antipsychotic medication to a prisoner, even if
originally constitutional under Harper, becomes unconstitutional once an
execution date is set because at that time it ceases to be in the prisoner's
medical interest").
219. The "cognitive test" involves determining whether a defendant on
death row "know[s] the fact of their impending execution and the reason for
it." Ford, 477 U.S. at 422 (Powell, J., concurring).
220. Singleton, 319 F.3d at 1020.
221. Id. at 1025.
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untary medication of a condemned inmate was narrowly tailored
to further an essential state interest. 222 The most contentious is-
sue, however, was whether it could ever be medically appropriate
to medicate a condemned inmate when doing so would ultimately
result in furthering the inmate's ability to be put to death.223 In
concluding that involuntary medication was medically appropri-
ate, the Eighth Circuit restricted its analysis solely to the imme-
diate effects the medication had in relieving Singleton's symptoms
of psychosis, while refusing to consider the ancillary effect of fa-
cilitating his eventual death by execution. 224 This approach by the
Eighth Circuit stands in stark contrast to that of the Louisiana
Supreme Court, which held that the state's medicate-to-execute
regime "[came] closer to being the cause of death in furthering the
state's punishment goal than to the practice of medicine or treat-
ment in the patient's best [medical] interest."225
Moreover, in Singleton, the Eighth Circuit gave no considera-
tion to the possibility that involuntary medication might inhibit
Singleton's ability to communicate with his counsel, or to partici-
pate effectively in the appeals process. Because the Eighth Circuit
applied the "cognitive test" as the sole criteria in defining Single-
ton's mental fitness under Ford,226 Singleton's ability to assist his
counsel throughout the appeals process became irrelevant since
the court's only concern was whether Singleton was aware of his
222. See id.
223. See id. at 1026 ("Central to Singleton's argument is his contention
that medication 'obviously is not in the prisoner's ultimate best medical in-
terest' where one effect of the medication is rendering the patient competent
for execution.").
224. See id. The Singleton court reasoned that:
Several doctors . . . have found the medication to be effective
in controlling Singleton's psychotic symptoms. Singleton's ar-
gument regarding his long-term medical interest boils down to
an assertion that execution is not in his medical interest. Eli-
gibility for execution is the only unwanted consequence of the
medication . . . . In the circumstances presented in this case,
the best medical interests of the prisoner must be determined
without regard to whether there is a pending execution.
Id.
225. State v. Perry, 610 So. 2d 746, 753 (La. 1992).
226. The Eighth Circuit applied the "cognitive test" without explicitly
naming it. See Singleton, 319 F.3d at 1027 ("Ford prohibits only the execution
of a prisoner who is unaware of the punishment he is about to receive and
why he is to receive it.").
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impending punishment and the reasons behind it.227 Because Sin-
gleton was foreclosed from presenting any evidence as to the pos-
sible impact that involuntary medication might have upon his
ability to assist counsel in obtaining a successful appeal of his
death sentence, the Eighth Circuit was left to conclude that the
only negative side effect from the proposed medication would be
Singleton's eventual trip to the death chamber. 228
Because the Supreme Court has already denied Singleton's
request for certiorari, 229 the Eighth Circuit's holding in Singleton
now stands as "good law." In addition, the Supreme Court's hold-
ing in Sell fortifies the Eighth Circuit's analysis in Singleton in
two significant ways. First, the Sell Court's conclusion that courts
should evaluate the severity of an alleged crime in determining
the appropriateness of medicating for trial competency purposes
works in favor of medicating a condemned inmate who has already
been convicted of capital murder, the most reprehensible crime
imaginable. 230 Second, by encouraging states to cloak all involun-
tary medication petitions under the pretext of a Harper finding of
dangerousness, 231 the Sell Court has turned a blind eye to the
alarming reality that the treatment decisions made by some
prison psychiatrists may be motivated not by an undivided loyalty
to the patient's psychiatric well-being, but rather by the desire of
government officials to ensure that all condemned inmates receive
their "just desserts." Furthermore, in weighing the strength of a
state's prosecutorial interests under the Sell Court's heightened
scrutiny analysis,232 lower courts will likely find that the alterna-
tive of indefinite confinement under a civil commitment order
cannot diminish the state's interest in executing a condemned in-
227. Id.
228. Id. at 1026 ("Eligibility for execution is the only unwanted conse-
quence of the medication.").
229. Singleton v. Norris, 540 U.S. 832, 832 (2003).
230. See Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166, 180 (2003) ("First, a court
must find that important governmental interests are at stake. The Govern-
ment's interest in bringing to trial an individual accused of a serious crime is
important."); cf Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 429 (1986) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("But I consider it self-evident that
once society has validly convicted an individual of a crime and therefore es-
tablished its right to punish, the demands of due process are reduced accord-
ingly.").
231. See discussion supra Part III.H.
232. See Sell, 539 U.S. at 179.
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mate because the state's interest in punishing those convicted
with capital murder undoubtedly exceeds any form of indefinite
incarceration.
The most disturbing aspect of the Supreme Court's refusal to
review the Eighth Circuit's holding in Singleton,233 however, is the
Court's apparent inability to recognize that those courts which
merely apply the "cognitive test" in defining an inmate's mental
fitness for execution will not apply any form of judicial scrutiny in
regard to the possible impact that involuntary medication might
have upon the inmate's ability to communicate and assist his
counsel during appeal. It is highly troublesome that many con-
demned inmates who have the most to lose will be denied the
same level of judicial protection granted to all pretrial detainees
under Sell, especially as it relates to the important right to assist
and communicate with counsel during the entire course of the ju-
dicial process in which one's ultimate fate will be decided. 234 Un-
der the current state of the law, a state's ability to restore a
condemned inmate's mental competency through the use of drugs
will hinge solely upon the jurisdiction's favored interpretation of
mental competency under Ford. The only way to remedy this obvi-
ous disparity is for the Court to revisit Ford by requiring all juris-
dictions to apply the "assistance prong,"235 in addition to the
"cognitive test,"236 thereby ensuring that the Sell Court's vigorous
protection of a pretrial detainee's right to assist and communicate
with counsel is extended to a condemned inmate's last efforts to
avoid execution. 237
V. CONCLUSION
Collectively, Sell and Singleton are indicative of a disturbing
movement in the law in which the prosecutorial interests of the
state may someday overshadow the historical duty of physicians
and psychiatrists to base all treatment decisions on the fulfillment
of a patient's best medical interest. In seeking to accommodate a
state's interest in prosecuting mentally incompetent defendants
233. See Singleton, 540 U.S. at 832.
234. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
235. See Singleton v. State, 437 S.E.2d 53, 56-57 (S.C. 1993).
236. See Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 422 (Powell, J., concurring).
237. See Sell, 539 U.S. at 181.
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with an individual's right to refuse unwanted medication, the Sell
Court has taken a definite, yet cautious, step toward granting
prosecutors the discretion to dictate the terms and conditions un-
der which mentally incompetent defendants are to be medicated.
Notwithstanding this unprecedented expansion of state power, the
Sell Court has given lower courts clear notice that the Supreme
Court may not turn a blind eye to the ways in which the state's
authority to administer antipsychotic drugs might be used to im-
pair a defendant's constitutional right to receive a fair trial. How-
ever, the Sell Court's holding coincides with recent developments
in the manufacture and distribution of a newer generation of an-
tipsychotic drugs that are not accompanied by the same debilitat-
ing side effects often associated with the older medications
traditionally prescribed by psychiatrists.238 In light of these cur-
rent developments, the Supreme Court may someday choose to re-
consider its current skepticism regarding the ability of prison
psychiatrists to prevent heavily medicated defendants from being
subjected to unfair prejudice at trial.239
Moreover, the current state of the law is even more unsettled
in regard to the numbers of mentally incompetent inmates who
currently reside on death row. 240 In declining to review the Eighth
Circuit's holding in Singleton,241 the Supreme Court missed an
important opportunity to clarify the disparate ways states have
measured the mental competency of condemned inmates awaiting
execution, thus providing condemned inmates with the same judi-
cial protections granted to pretrial detainees under Sell. Instead,
238. The newer generation of drugs, commonly known as "atypical" or
"novel" antipsychotics, tend not to cause the same severe neurological side
effects, such as tardive dyskinesia, as do their older counterparts. Siegel
supra note 53, at 348-49. However, although these newer drugs are effective
in alleviating many of the acute symptoms of psychosis, not much is known
about their long-term efficacy; nor are they widely available in injectable
form. Id. at 349. Until these newer drugs become more available in injectable
form, prison psychiatrists will not be able to administer these drugs to un-
willing patients. Id. at 349 n.235; Paul A. Nidich & Jacqueline Collins, Invol-
untary Administration of Psychotropic Medication: A Federal Court Update,
11 (No. 4) HEALTH LAw. 12, 13 n.21 (May 1999).
239. See Nidich & Collins, supra note 238, at 13 (arguing that in light of
the recent improvements in the manufacture of psychotropic drugs, the Su-
preme Court "should revisit this issue with an open mind").
240. See Harding, supra note 200, at 113-16 (discussing increases in the
number of mentally incompetent condemned inmates).
241. See Singleton v. Norris, 540 U.S. 832, 832 (2003).
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prosecutors have a greater incentive to use a mentally incompe-
tent condemned inmate's propensity for dangerousness as a pre-
text merely to render the inmate mentally fit for execution. By
granting the government the limited authority to medicate men-
tally incompetent defendants for trial competency purposes, the
Court may have unknowingly accorded the government the unlim-
ited power to use the therapeutic benefits of psychiatric medica-
tion to bring condemned inmates to the threshold of the death
chamber.
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